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Abstract
The recent financial crises in emerging markets have motivated a number of proposed mea-
sures that might regulate or provide protection against readily reversible external capital flows.
Possible reforms include the adoption of self-protection policies by developing countries that
augment traditional macroeconomic and financial sector measures for preventing crises. One
set of proposals seek to enhance the liquidity of governments during a crisis, while other pro-
posals seek to reduce exposure to short-term external debt. This paper analyzes some major
proposals for self-protection using alternative models of the causes of financial crises in open
economies. The effectiveness of liquidity enhancing measures and of capital controls for cri-
sis prevention is shown to depend upon the alleged underlying cause of potential crises. It is
also possible that liquidity enhancement could be counterproductive. The economic impact of
recent crises on afflicted countries has led some economists to question whether the benefits
of capital account liberalization outweigh the costs of exposure to greater volatility in real eco-
nomic performance. A simple approach for comparing, in simulation, the benefits of capital
account openness to the costs of exposure to financial crises is discussed in the first part of the
paper.1
1. Introduction
Recent financial crises have raised concerns that international financial market integration
creates more risks than benefits for the real economic performance of developing countries.
These concerns have focussed attention on the potential volatility of short-term capital flows
and on proposals that measures be taken to regulate or protect against rapid reversals of capital
flows to developing countries. Capital controls have been adopted by Chile and Malaysia in
recent years for just this purpose. Many economists have proposed that countries self-protect
against financial crises through the accumulation of reserves or by arranging contingent lines
of credit that can be drawn against in the event of a crisis.
This paper discusses some of these alternative policy proposals in light of the recent the-
oretical literature on financial and currency crises in developing countries. I first discuss the
potential costs and benefits of financial openness, albeit in a non-comprehensive way. In par-
ticular, a simple approach is proposed for making benchmark estimates of the potential costs of
financial crises that can be compared with estimates of the gains from full optimizing liberal-
ization of world financial markets.
Next,Icomparetwocompetingexplanationsofthecausesofinternationalfinancialcrisesfor
the purpose of understanding how sensitive policy proposals may be to the assumed theoretical
model. One of these views is that financial crises are driven by incompatibility between an
exchange rate peg and other macroeconomic policies. The other approach argues that financial
crises occur as one of many equilibria that are possible in the presence of a maturity mismatch
between external liabilities and domestic real assets.
The proposal that countries accumulate reserves to cover short-term debt obligations is ana-
lyzed in the context of these two approaches to modelling financial crises. I argue that reserve
accumulations intended to thwart a speculative attack can be counterproductive. Instead, they2
may result in a currency crisis that would not otherwise occur when the fiscal consequences of
interest rate differentials between developing and advanced-industrialized country public debt
are taken into account. It is shown that the use of a contingent lines of credit does not have the
same implications for the sustainability of a pegged exchange rate regime. This is a main point
of the paper.
Lastly, a comparison is made of the costs of alternative recent proposals and policies for
controlling short-term capital inflows and outflows. The four policies are a Chilean entry tax
on capital flows, a Tobin tax on capital inflows or outflows, contingent suspensions of capital
account convertibility (as imposed by Malaysia in 1997) and direct controls on short-term debt
accumulations by the domestic banking system. It is shown that all have drawbacks, but that
a proportionate transactions tax on capital flows may be less desirable than an entry tax or
contingent temporary suspensions of convertibility.
2. Benefits of Financial Openness and Costs of Financial Crises
Liberalizing international financial transactions can create opportunities for the residents of
a country to diversify their savings portfolios across a broader range of risky assets than may
be available on domestic financial markets. Financial integration allows domestic savings and
investment decisions to become separated. When domestic residents can take advantage of
international risk diversification, the share of domestic investment devoted to riskier capital
rather than low return safe financial instruments can rise. When domestic firms are able to take
advantage of a more broadly diversified international financial market, the cost of investing in
high variance and high mean return projects falls. Under the critical caveat that international
financial markets are undistorted, there should be gains from international financial trade just
as there are for international goods trade.3
A benchmark for considering the gains from financial liberalization is provided by Obstfeld
[1994]. He quantifies these gains in a stochastic model of endogenous growth. In Obstfeld’s
model, the only market imperfection is the closure of national economies to international finan-
cial asset transactions so that liberalizing financial flows is always welfare improving. Open-
ing the capital account in the model economy causes a greater share of savings to be invested in
higher return capital in an endogenous growth model. This leads to a higher equilibriumgrowth
rate, which in turn yields large gains from financial market integration. These gains arise be-
cause the standard deviation of the household savings portfolio decreases in equilibrium with
international integration. In simulations using national stock market returns from 1960 to 1987,
Obstfeld estimates the welfare gains over status quo portfolios for regions of the world from
introducing the optimal global mutual fund. These gains can be enormous, ranging from 23
percent for East Asia to over 450 percent for Africa and Northern Asia.
These estimates have to be taken carefully in terms of the assumptions of financial market
completeness and no policy distortions, including sovereign risk. In particular, workers face
very few opportunities to diversify labor income risk. Integration that causes a greater propor-
tion of total financial resources to be allocated to risky domestic capital typically raises labor
income risk. For households with little or no financial wealth, integration may raise the aggre-
gate mean growth rate while increasing the riskiness of their human wealth. This increase can
have adverse effects on income distribution and on the accumulation of human capital or other
household investments. If integration leads to an increase in the variance of the net returns to
total wealth for some residents, then the endogenous growth model implies that a reduction in
the welfare for those households results from financial liberalization.
In the presence of incomplete financial markets subject to intrinsic (noise trading) or ex-
trinsic (sunspot) noise, financial market liberalization can raise the aggregate risk for domestic4
residentsloweringoverallnationalwelfare. Liberalizingfinancialmarketscanexposethecoun-
try to speculative capital flows that can be disruptive to domestic investment and incomes and
reduce long-run rates of economic growth.
Oneconcernisthatcapitalaccountliberalizationleadstofinancialcrises. Inoneof theviews
offinancialcrisesdiscussedbelow, crisesariseasaconsequenceof policydistortionsassociated
with government guarantees of foreign financial claims. In this case, a portion of the risk of
domestic investment is transferred from foreign residents to domestic residents. The net effect
of financial integration under such implicit or explicit public insurance of foreign capital in-
flows can be an increase in the volatility of domestic residents’ consumption. In another view,
financial crises occur in some of several possible equilibrium outcomes that arise as a conse-
quence of a maturity mismatch between short-term capital inflows and long-term productive
investment. Short-term capital flows can also increase the variance of investment and income
in this view. The impact of liberalization and short-term capital flows on the standard deviation
of aggregate incomes and on the distribution of income is an empirical matter. A benchmark
estimate of the welfare costs or benefits of capital market liberalization could be calculated us-
ing the endogenous growth framework given estimates of the change in standard deviations of
GDP growth from historical data.
Thewelfarecostsof financialcrisescanbeestimatedwhencrisesaretakenasisolatedevents
using a simple endogenous growth model in continuous-time without uncertainty. The technol-
ogydisplaysconstantreturnstoscalewithrespecttoaccumulablefactorsofproduction, labelled
as capital &. The production function is given by
+| ' o|&|c (1)
where the rate of return to capital varies over time in response to a shock. The household sector5























































as afunction ofinitial financialwealth percapitaand the growth rateofconsumption percapita.








The welfare implications of temporary or permanent decreases in the growth rate are calcu-
lated by comparing ex post household welfare in the absence and in the presence of the shock.
The welfare costs of a growth reduction are determined by calculating the equivalent variation
of wealth. This is the increase in wealth that would be required to achieve the status quo ante
level of utility under the growth shock.
For a permanent growth reduction (with j 9'for simplicity’s sake), welfare under the two
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wheree o isthepost-shockproductivityofcapitalande } isthepost-shockpercapitaoutputgrowth6
rate. Setting e L| ' L| determines the level of wealth, e &|, necessary to make post-shock welfare
equal to domestic welfare before the productivity shock. e &| is the actual capital stock, &|c plus
theequivalentvariationinwealthneededtoachievethe statusquoante welfare. Theequivalent
variation is given by
e &|
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For example, let thepure subjective rate of discount, 4, equal 0.02 and the intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution, *j, be 0.5. For an initial growth rate of per capita GDP equal to 4 percent
falling permanentlyto 3 percent, theloss in welfaremeasured bytheequivalent variationequals
56 percent.
For a temporary reduction in the growth rate of per capita output, the equivalent variation in
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In this equation, thegrowth rate temporarily falls to an average ofe } from} for A periods. Using
the same values for the discount rate and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and letting
the growth rate fall from 5 percent per annum to zero percent per annum for A years, we have
e &|
&|
'd 2Di TEf2An Do
2  (11)
For a two-year reduction in growth, the equivalent variation is 20.6 percent.
The calculation of the equivalent variation is last modified to allow for time-varying an-
nual growth rates. The utility of the representative household under a time-varying disturbance

























The solution for the consumption function for the household is
e S| ' e &|
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The growth rate of per capita GDP in Asian crisis countries was roughly 5 percent before the
crisis. The growth rate for Korea fell by approximately 7-8 percent in the first year followed
by a partial recovery in the second. The equivalent variation of the welfare loss for a fall in the
growthrateof8percentinthefirstyear, 5percent(fromthepre-crisisrate)inthesecondandfull
recovery in the third is 28 percent. For Thailand, the growth rate fell approximately 13 percent
inthefirstyearand10percentinthesecondrelativetothepre-crisisgrowthrate. Theequivalent
variation for these rough numbers with a return to the pre-crisis growth rate in the third year
is 54 percent. For Obstfeld’s stochastic version of this model, the net gain from optimal global
diversification for all of East Asia was 22.6%. This suggests that the costs of a one-time only
crisis as part of the adjustment to financial liberalization might not be insignificant without
intervention.
An alternative estimate of the costs of liberalization could be made using the stochastic en-
dogenous growth model of Obstfeld [1994] if estimates of the permanent effect on the standard

















where - is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and D2 is the standard deviation of per capita
consumption growth.
3. Sources of Financial Crises
Two competing views of currency and financial crises have emerged in the theoretical liter-
ature in recent years (see, for example, Calvo [1998a, b], Caballero and Krishnamurthy [1998],
Chang and V elasco [1998], Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini [1998a,b,c], Furman and Stiglitz
[1998], Mishkin [1996], among many others). In one view, economic fundamentals are the
source of a currency crisis and its consequent financial crisis. In the basic version, a speculative
attack on the exchange rate regime results from fiscal and monetary policies that are inconsis-
tent with the chosen exchange rate peg. This is the familiar model of a collapsing exchange rate
regime due to Krugman [1979]. Capital account and financial liberalization without adequate
domestic prudential regulation can lead to a banking crisis as intermediaries take on excessive
levels of debt and risk in the presence of moral hazard. In the fundamentals view, there is a
mismatch between policies that leaves the country vulnerable to a financial crisis.
The second view regards recent financial and currency crises as financial panics that result
from the simultaneous actions of creditors and need not have occurred. The extension of cur-
rencycrisesmodelsbyObstfeld[1986]demonstratesthepossibilityofmultipleequilbriasothat
a crisis may occur but is not inevitable. A financial crisis is one possible outcome in an inter-
national economy with multiple equilibria. Illiquidity of the financial sector rather than policy
unsustainability plays the central role in recent theoretical models taking this perspective. In
these models there is a maturity mismatch between the foreign liabilities and domestic assets9
of the private or public sector. In the pure liquidity view, short-term borrowing to finance long-
term investments is the Achilles heel of the system that exposes nations to potential financial
panics.
The diversity of macroeconomic conditions preceding currency crises suggests that both
views, separately or in combination, deserve attention in policy analysis. It is also evident that
the impact of policy prescriptions may be quite different depending on the source of financial
crises. Both approaches can be used to analyze the vulnerability of national economies to rapid
financial capital inflows and outflows. I first discuss the traditional model (also known as the
first-generation model) as it has been applied to the explanation of the Asian financial crises. I
explain that it can yield either an inevitable, fundamentals driven crisis or a crisis that occurs
as one possible but not inevitable equilibrium. I then discuss the role of short-term lending for
generating a liquidity crisis.
3.1 Public sector guarantees and financial crises
The most recent version of the fundamentals view emphasizes government subsidization of
privatesectorforeignborrowing. Theimportanceofimplicitorexplicitpublicsectorguarantees
of foreign debt repayment for developing country financial crises was raised by Diaz Alejandro
[1985]. His observations and arguments form the basis for recent models that emphasize the
role of governments as underwriters of foreign debts accumulated by private banks and firms
(see, forexample, Calvo [1998b], Burnside, etal[1999]andDooley[1999]). In particular, Diaz
Alejandro argued that it is at best difficult for a debtor country government to refuse to assume
private foreign debt in the event of a financial crisis. Ex post debt guarantees may be implicit
even if explicitly denied ex ante.
While the subsidization of foreign borrowing may be subject to cronyism or other forms of
corruption, distortions in the flow of capital to developing countries due to sovereign risk can10
also provide a rationale for public sector intervention. The value of loans made to domestic
intermediaries is sensitive to domestic monetary, fiscal and regulatory policies that are chosen
by the government to advance domestic interests. When sovereign immunity is a binding con-
straint on financial integration, we should expect the domestic rate of return to capital to exceed
the foreign opportunity cost of financial capital. Foreign creditors are naturally reluctant to
lend in domestic currency because the sovereign determines its own monetary policy. Even if
all loans are denominated in foreign currency, the ability of domestic intermediaries or firms
to service foreign debts is impaired by sudden devaluations or depreciations of the domestic
currency. Exchange rate pegs are often adopted as part of a policy package to provide a stable
monetary environment for foreign creditors. Experience has shown that when an exchange peg
is abandoned, governments guarantee foreign currency liabilities in part or whole. A govern-
ment may seek to promote efficiency-enhancing capital inflows by insuring foreign creditors
against losses caused by its own policy changes but not against individual project risk or bank
failure.
A government debt guarantee must be calculated into the public sector budget as a contin-
gent increase in public debt. When a government guarantee is invoked, there is an increase in
outstanding public debt and subsequent interest obligations. In the event that the guarantee is
invoked and the subsequent increase in the public sector budget deficit is monetized, a tradi-
tional (first-generation) speculative attack on a pegged exchange rate can occur. The details
of how the government accumulates contingent liabilities determine whether such guarantees
might actually be invoked.
A standard monetary model of the exchange rate that takes account of the public sector sol-
vency constraint is useful for illustrating the role of government guarantees in financial crises.11
A simple discrete-time model is given by equations (1) through (4):
6|  R| ' )+|  B|c (17)
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where 6, R, RW, + and r are the logarithms of the monetary base, price level, foreign price level,
real income and spot nominal exchange rate, respectively. The shadow exchange rate is given
by
h r| 'E nB
3￿ dh 6|  R
W
|  )+| n B
W
| n B.|h r|n￿o (20)
The monetary base if an attack just occurs at time | is given by h 6| ' *L}E|  7|-|,w h e r e
| is the level of the money supply, -| is the stock of central bank reserves and 7| is the pegged
exchange rate.
The public sector budget identity is given by
7| E|n￿  |'
W
|7|| n (| n 7| E-|n￿  -|  o
W
|7|-|  E|n￿  |c (21)
where | is outstanding stock of public debt denominated in foreign currency at the beginning
of period |and (| is the primary public sector budget deficit. W is the nominal (in foreign
currency) rate of interest for domestic government debt, while oW is the foreign nominal rate
of interest paid to reserves. It is assumed that W  oW.I f W ' oW, the government pays no
interest premium on its debt relative to foreign reserves. For developing countries we expect W
to exceed oW.
Under the contingent government liabilities story, domestic credit expansion,
E|n￿  7|-|n￿  E|  7|-|'
W
|7|| n (|  o
W
|7|-|  7| E|n￿  |c (22)
isconsistentwiththepeggedratebeforeacrisisoccurs. Thedeficitandrequireddomesticcredit12
creation rise conditionally on the crisis and lead to depreciation afterwards.
First, consider a case in which the contingent increase in the deficit, {(, is fixed. Suppose
that the exchange rate peg is consistent with pre-crisis fiscal policy. That is, the peg would be
sustainable in the absence of the contingent insurance. In this case, when initial reserves are
sufficiently large, the shadow exchange is less than the pegged rate and will never rise above
the peg. A currency crisis will never occur. However, if the shadow rate equals the pegged rate,
then multiple equilibria are possible. In one equilibrium, there is no crisis and the shadow rate
does not rise above the pegged rate. In another equilibrium, the crisis occurs and the deficit
increases by {(. This is an example of a second-generation model of a collapsing exchange
rate regime, as in Obstfeld [1986]. Given fiscal policies and the structure of the economy, an
exogenous increasein thereserves that the central bank commits to defending theexchangerate
regime lowers the shadow exchange rate. If the increase in committed reserves is sufficiently
large, then thecrisis equilibriaareeliminated. Below, I consider how borrowing reserves affects
this outcome.
Things are different if the contingent liability can rise over time. In many countries, the cost
of government guarantees appear to have risen with outstanding private foreign currency debt.
Chinn and Kletzer [1999] and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo [1999] consider currency
crisis models in which private banks accumulate foreign debt which is guaranteed implicitly by
the government in the event of a collapse of the exchange regime. The ratio of non-performing
assets to liabilities for the banking system rises endogenously over time. The government’s
contingent liabilities rise over time until the reserves that the central bank will use in defending
the peg and the implied post-crisis increase in domestic credit expansion just make the shadow
exchangerate, h 7|,equaltothepeggedrate,7|. Inthesemodels,crisesareinevitableandbanking
crises and currency crises are simultaneous. Output growth collapses with the financial crisis13
in the endogenous growth version of Chinn and Kletzer [1999].
3.2 Short-term debt and liquidity crises
The standard model of the liquidity view of recent financial crises (see, for example, Chang
and V elasco [1998], Goldfajn and Valdes [1997] and Sachs, Tornell and V elasco [1996]) is based
on the Diamond and Dybvig [1983] model of bank runs. Short-term debt finances long-term
productive investments. Risky capital is productive after two periods, yielding an expected
return in excess of the riskless rate of return. If a project is liquidated early, the return is less
than the riskless rate.
An investment of size & made at date t yields o	 W in period | nand - in period | n2
where .|E n - : E n W2. o may be negative (but larger than ). A domestic bank
makes this loan using credit extended by foreign savers. It is assumed that a lender receives net
interest W for each period as long as the bank has liquid resources to meet withdrawal demand.
An early withdrawal of size %& requires the liquidation of part of the capital to pay the amount
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per unit invested in period |,w h e r e% is the ratio of short-term debt that is liquidated in period
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which is assumed so that long-term investments are desirable. Whenever% satisfies the condi-
tion,
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every lender that can should withdraw her funds, receiving E n o per unit lent in period | and
earning the opportunity gross interest E n W between periods | nand | n2 . Long-term
lenders receive a net rate of return less than W if
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where %	.
Therefore, if all debt is short-term, self-fulfilling runs are possible in this economy. In one
equilibrium, no lender withdraws her funds in period | and the project yields maximum surplus.
In another, all lenders withdraw in period | receiving a total return of E n o& and there is no
period |n2production. In this approach, a currency crisis takes place in the same fashion as in
Obstfeld [1986]: if all participants demand reserves, reserves are exhausted forcing the central
bank to abandon an exchange rate peg that would have been otherwise sustainable. Financial
crises arise because domestic liquid assets are insufficient to cover the short-term liabilities
of the domestic financial sector leading to a run on central bank reserves. Gestation lags in
investment generate a collapse in output consequent to a financial crisis.
In the absence of government intervention, the Diamond-Dybvig model of bank runs pro-
vides a rationale for self-fulfilling currency and financial crises. However, liquidity crises can
only occur if market imperfections restrict the use of long-term debt contracts. Under optimal
loan contracts, the possibility of Pareto-inferior multiple equilibria is eliminated. Short-term
lending can dominate in an equilibrium with imperfect financial markets. Rodrik and V elasco
[1999] demonstrate that short-term borrowing can arise in the equilibrium of the model out-
lined above as a consequence of the possibility of bank panics. Sovereign risk can also lead to
short maturity loans by creating a short-leash on government or private behavior. The appendix
explains these rationale for why we may observe short-maturity foreign debt.15
4. Policy Interventions
Both government guarantees and short-term lending can be explained as responses to finan-
cial market imperfections arising from sovereign risk. Appropriate prudential regulation of the
domestic financial industry may be the best way to mitigate the potential problems of volatile
short-term international capital flows. Another may be overcoming the ‘‘fear of floating’’ by
developing country governments during financial liberalization and reform. However, man-
aged flexibility and exchange rate pegs have their own justification at times and sophisticated
financial regulation requires significant administrative capacity to achieve. Several alternative
policy remedies have proposed for helping debtor nations to manage volatile short-term capital
flows and reduce the incidence of financial crises in either magnitude or frequency. I consider
the impact of this in light of both views of the sources of recent financial crises.
4.1 Reserves and contingent credit facilities
One approach to policy intervention that has been widely advocated is the accumulation of
larger levels of reserves by developing countries and the creation of contingent credit lines (see,
for example, Feldstein [1999]). Alan Greenspan has proposed the accumulation of reserves
equal to the amount of debt maturing within one year. Lines of credit could be provided by
official sources (such as the IMF, as proposed by the Clinton Administration and endorsed by
the G-7 in 1998), private financial institutions or a combination of the two. The models of
Section 2 are useful for considering the usefulness of these ways of achieving higher levels of
central bank liquidity.
A sufficiently high level of foreign currency reserves held by the central bank would allow a
country to avoid a currency crisis generated as an inferior equilibrium in a multiple equilibrium
world. Inthegovernmentguaranteesmodelortheliquiditycrisismodel,asufficientlyhighlevel16
of reserves assures that the shadow exchange rate always remains below the pegged rate when
macroeconomic policies are consistent with the chosen exchange rate regime. In such cases,
the central bank has the resources to successfully fend off an attempted attack on the exchange
parity or to act as a domestic lender of last resort meeting the demands of all foreign creditors
to the private sector. If fundamentals disfavor the exchange rate, then the regime is ultimately
unsustainable. The simple model from the literature shows that higher reserves postpone the
day of reckoning for the peg.
Unfortunately, reserves do not exogenously increase. Feldstein [1999] suggests that coun-
tries accumulate higher levels of reserves to protect themselves against speculative attacks or
liquidity crises. There is a cost to raising central bank reserves for many countries. This is the
difference between the interest paid on the country’s public debt and the interest earned on for-
eign reserves, typically the rate of interest for U.S. Treasury or similar debt. This is the interest
rate differential, WoW, included in equations (21) and (22). An increase in reserves implies an
equal increase in public debt; equivalently, if the additional reserves were not added to the cen-
tral bank’s assets, then the same amount of government debt could have been purchased by the
central bank. For all purposes, a debtor government borrows to increase central bank reserves
for self-protection under this proposal.
TheactofaccumulatingreserveswhenW :o W isidenticaltotheproblemofsterilizingcapital
inflows in thepresence ofquasi-fiscal costs as defined by Calvo [1991]. The costs of sterilizing
capital inflows have been estimated by Khan and Reinhart [1994] for Latin American countries
and by Kletzer and Spiegel [1998] for Pacific Basin countries. They both find that the net costs
ofsterilization werebetween 0.25%and 0.5%of gross domesticproduct during periods oflarge
capital inflows post-1985. Kletzer and Spiegel find further that these costs can be as high as
one percent of GDP for brief episodes of capital inflows. Because these estimates represent the17
quasi-fiscal costs of reserve accumulated during attempts to sterilize capital inflows, the costs
of raising reserves to match one year of debt amortization are likely to be much higher.
The interest rate differential between developing country debt and foreign reserves has con-
sequences for using reserves for self-protection. To show this, I begin by adding an increase in
reserves in the amount {-| to the flow budget identity of the government:
E|n￿  7|-|n￿E|  7|-|'
W
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The costs of borrowed reserves, EW
|  oW
|7|{-, can be financed by current or future public
spendingcuts,taxrevenueincreasesormonetization. Givenfiscalpolicies, solvingthisforward
and imposing theconventionalsolvencycriterion on thegovernment implies anet present value


























When W :o W, current or future monetization of the increase in the public sector budget deficit
must rise.
This increase in the growth rate of the monetary base is a change in fundamentals. Suppose
that a pegged exchange rate was consistent with macroeconomic fundamentals before the ac-
cumulation of reserves. The borrowing of reserves now makes that peg unsustainable in the
absence of fiscal adjustment. Eventually, the exchange rate regime will collapse following the
Krugman [1979] or Flood and Garber [1984] models. If the accumulation of reserves was un-
dertaken to avoid a possible liquidity crisis, it is self-defeating. The additional reserves cause a
financial crisis, instead of preventing one.
In the case of a self-fulfilling crisis unjustified by fundamentals, increasing central bank
reserves can be helpful if the interest rates are equal. Whether this can work depends on the
maturity of government debt. If the government borrows long-term, then foreign creditors only18
demandimmediaterepaymentofprivatedebts. Inthisevent, thegovernmentspendsitsreserves
and assumes private debts (either through government guarantees or by providing liquidity to
the domestic financial sector). However, if government debt is short-maturity, then foreign
creditors demand repayment by the government, leaving no extra resources from the borrowed
reserves for bailing out the private sector. Short-term public borrowing to accumulate foreign
reserves is at best costless and useless.
If the exchange rate peg is inconsistent with macroeconomic fundamentals, then borrowing
reserves can either postpone or advance the date of a currency crisis. This has been shown by
Buiter [1987] for the Flood and Garber [1984] model when domestic and foreign government
debt pay the same rate of interest (W ' oW). Borrowing reserves, {-, raises the post-crisis
rate of domestic credit creation by the amount W{- although it does not raise the pre-crisis
rate of domestic credit creation. This is because the interest-bearing reserves are gone after
the defense of the exchange regime is over but the public debt incurred raising them remains.
Before a crisis, there are two opposing effects of reserve accumulation: the rate of growth of
the shadow exchange rate rises and current reserves are higher. If the reserves are borrowed
closetotheonsetofaspeculativeattack, itispostponedbecausethereserveincreasedominates.
Accumulatingreserveswellinadvanceofthedateoftheattackbringsthecrisisforwardbecause
the rate of growth of the shadow exchange rate is the dominate effect.
Drawingonofficial contingent credit lines duringa crisis canbeeffectiveforstoppinga self-
fulfilling liquidity crisis. If the government borrows reserves from a contingent credit facility
at the same interest cost that foreign reserves earn, then the shadow exchange rate,
h r| 'E nB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falls because h 6| ' *L}E|  7|-| falls with a rise in reserves, -|. A fundamentals-driven
crisis will be postponed as demonstrated by Buiter. This may be a superior policy reform for19
preventing or stopping liquidity crises but it is costly if crises are caused by inconsistencies in
macroeconomic policies.
Some proposals have called for the private provision of contingent credit facilities for the
purpose of bailing private creditors into the resolution of financial crises. These have been
criticized on the basis that private creditors can hedge against the contingent loans they write.
Thishedging,calleddynamichedging,consistsofreducingotherloanstothecountryinanequal
amount to the contingent credit when the contingency arises. These means that the contingent
lines of credit need not increase the resources available to the government in the event of a
crisis. This problem of non-additivity is identical to the neutrality of issuing short-term debt
to borrow reserves at equal rates of interest noted above. The contingent borrowing facilities
would be of no consequence if the offset is complete.
4.2 Capital controls
The analog of bank runs to developing country financial and currency crises suggests that
a remedy lies in attaining a better match between the maturities of domestic assets and foreign
liabilities. Restrictions on short-term borrowing address this issue and have drawn renewed
interest from economists and policymakers since the onset of the Asian financial crisis.
Four types of capital account restrictions have received the most attention. The first of
these is a Tobin tax, a proportionate tax on capital inflows or outflows (Eichengreen, Tobin
and Wyplosz [1995]). The second is a one-time tax on capital inflows as adopted by Chile and
recently relaxed. The third are contingent controls on capital outflows as imposed by Malaysia
during the Asian crisis. Lastly, Calvo [1997] and others have proposed direct controls on short-
term bank borrowing.
Each of these is subject to concerns that they can be circumvented and will not effectively
control capital flows as intended. That issue has been discussed widely (see, for example,20
Garber and Taylor [1995]). Here, I consider the resource allocation effects of the different
approaches in light of the popular models of recent financial crises.
First, considerthecostsofrestrictingshort-termbutnotlong-termdebt. Asnoted, short-term
debt may be an equilibrium solution for capital mobility under market imperfections associated
with sovereign risk. Short-term lending may provide a short-leash allowing lenders to with-
draw funds quickly in anticipation of a policy or regime change that would reduce their returns.
Unfortunately, longer term lending is associated with countries whose policy regimes are per-
ceived to be more stable and pose a lower risk of sovereign default. This makes it difficult or
impossible to estimate how restricting short-term lending might affect total capital flows in a
cross-section of countries. Another reason for short-term debt, as observed by Rodrik and V e-
lasco, is that individual investors do not takeinto account thesocial costs of borrowing short. In
this case, eliminating short-term debt for all but short maturity investments is beneficial rather
than costly. On net, we do not have a clear idea of the costs of restricting short-term debt. How-
ever, the models of financial crises do imply that there are gross benefits of achieving superior
maturity matches. In the time-to-build economy, discouraging short-term in favor of long-term
lending reduces the possibility of bank runs ceteris parabis.
I consider each of these types of controls in turn.
1. A proportionate tax on capital outflows taxes short and long-term lending equally in the
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for a constant proportionate growth rate equal to ? and tax on capital outflows equal to .T h e21


















This calculation assumesthatrepayments arerolled over into newloanswith investments grow-
ing at the constant rate ?, so that the tax is only applied to actual capital outflows not full net
earnings. Theterm E n ?
2 representsthetaxdeductionrealized by relendinginterestearn-
ings within the country.
The tax raises the cost of foreign capital, even though it discourages net outflows of capital.
F o r e i g nr e t u r n sn e to ft h et a xo nf u l lr e p a t r i a t i o no fl o a n sw o u l db e
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if %  E n o*E n  where % equals the share of short-term debt in total debt, and
E  En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if %:E n o*E n .
For short-term capital outflows %, the returns to withdrawing short-term capital for the next
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E￿no￿ :  by equation
(33). e % is increasing in  for fixed W and ? but is always strictly bounded away from unity.
Imposing the Tobin tax on capital outflows cannot eliminate the possibility of a financial panic.
Other potential problems arise for the Tobin tax in the presence of intrinsic asset market
noise. Kupiec [1995] in a model of the stock market shows that an asset transactions tax can
lead to a rise in the volatility of rates of returns to assets. This occurs in general equilibrium (he22
adopts an overlapping generations model) because mean asset prices fall along with asset price
volatility as a consequence of the transactions tax. Translating this to the case of short-term
international capital flows, it implies that a Tobin tax can raise domestic interest rates while
lowering the variance of exchange rates and reducing capital flows so that the volatility of real
asset yields rises.
2. In May 1992, Chile increased its reserve requirement on capital inflows to 30% (paid
zero interest) for a period of one year (Agosin and Ffrench-Davis [1998]). The consensus for
the Chilean case appears to be that capital controls changed the maturity composition of capital
inflowswithlimitedlong-runimpactonthevolumeofnetinflows(see,forexample,Budnevich
and Lefort [1997] and Montiel and Reinhart [1997]). Edwards [1998] argues that the controls
did not insulate Chile from the disturbances to international capital markets of the Asian finan-
cial crises. He notes that the interest rate response was greater in Chile than in Hong Kong and
interprets this as evidence that the controls were ineffective. I argue that thechange in thematu-
rity structure of capital inflows and interest rate volatility are evidence that the controls worked
as intended. They reduced short-term debt exposure without reducing integration with inter-
national capital markets. The interest rate responses are evidence of continued capital market
integration.
This policy imposes a tax that is diminishing with maturity. This differential tax is easy to
represent in time-to-build models. The contractual interest for a loan made in period | and held
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if repayment in full is certain.
The potential benefits of this policy can be seen by considering a given probability R of a23

















































































These expressions imply that the gap between the long-term equilibrium interest rate and
the short-term equilibrium interest rate decreases with the capital inflows entry tax. The term
structure of interest rates favors longer term borrowing. This has the correct incentive effects if
short-term borrowing is socially inefficiently high.
3. Krugman[1999]suggestsimposingrestrictionsoncapitaloutflowsintheinstanceofacri-
sis. Such controls were imposed by Malaysia and recently removed. If contingent suspensions
of convertibility are imposed during a liquidity crisis, they are a perfect instrument for halting a
run. In the model of financial panics contingent controls eliminate the Pareto inefficient equi-
libria. They are never invoked in equilibrium, but their presence rules out bad outcomes. In
the models, contingent controls invoked during a crisis that is not justified by fundamentals are24
Pareto improving.
Contingent suspensions of convertibility can result in lower capital inflows if lenders per-
ceive that they might be imposed when a capital outflows is caused by deteriorating economic
fundamentals. They may also be used to defend an exchange rate regime that is not sustain-
able under current fiscal and monetary policies. In this case, such controls can reduce welfare
because they imply that domestic financial repression is being used to maintain the status quo
exchange rate regime and fiscal policy. It is difficult to evaluate whether these controls will
only be used to defend against a financial panic rather than a capital outflow reflecting adverse
lender information about future real returns. A reasonable interpretation is that Malaysia sus-
pended convertibility in the face of potential contagion during the Asian financial crisis. This
fits the justification in terms of the Chang and V elasco approach to financial crises.
4. With perfect information direct controls on short-term borrowing can be used to target
an appropriate mix of short-term and long-term borrowing. In the pure financial panics view,
eliminating short-term debt solves the problem. Calvo [1997] discusses the arguments for such
controls. While quantitative controls have well-known disadvantages compared with price-
based restrictions, this could be an appropriate approach forcountries seeking to takeadvantage
ofinternational financial capital market access for the private sector without a sophisticated and
well-regulated domestic financial sector.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides a preliminary and partial assessment of the costs and benefits of pol-
icy interventions aimed at reducing the impact of short-term capital mobility on real income
volatility in developing countries. The analysis of contingency funds versus reserve accumu-
lations suggests that neither may be very useful. Reserve accumulations may bring about the25
very currency collapses they are intended to protect against. The analysis of the costs of capital
controls gives an edge to both entry taxes as imposed by Chile and temporary suspensions of
convertibility in a crisis over proportionate taxes on foreign exchange transactions.26
Appendix : Rationale for short-term lending
There are several reasons why we might observe short-term lending in an economy with
gestation lags in capital formation. One is uncoordinated borrower behavior when there are a
large number of borrowers. It is easy to calculate equilibrium interest rates for short and long
term debt given a probability of a bank run. This has been done by Rodrik and V elasco [1999].
In the notation used in this paper, if %  %  E n o*E n W, the short-term interest rate is



























where it has been assumed that short-term lenders are paid proportionately in a run. The long-










A simple calculation shows that the investor maximizes expected surplus by taking only long-
term debt in this model when she takes account of the endogeneity of the long-term and short-
term interest rates to % given R. If she does not internalize the effect of her financing decision
on 7 and u, then the expected return to borrowing short-term is positive. Sovereign immunity
provides a reason why lenders will prefer to lend on short maturities. In reputational models of
sovereign borrowing, threats of lending moratoria provide repayment incentives. Kletzer and
Wright [1999] demonstrate that punishments that are proof to renegotiation provide the same
incentives as permanent exclusion from credit market access in a very general model. The
borrowing moratorium needs to last only one period. The important quantity for determining
how much consumption-smoothing is achievable through international borrowing and lending27
is the surplus gained through borrowing itself. The greater the cost of a cut-off from access to
international credit, themore that can belent under the threatof potential repudiation ordefault.
Usingthislogic,withlong-termloanstheshort-runcosttoadefaultinperiod|istheforegone










where &| is equilibrium foreign lending in period | in the equilibrium constrained by sovereign
risk. There is no default on loans due in period | n .
Suppose that an input of capital is needed in the second period of a project to bring the
project to completion. In this case, the project yields the uncertain net output - in period | n2
if investments equal to *2 are made in each of periods | and |n. If no investment is made in
period |n, then net output is o. In this situation, assumethat a long-term loan commits foreign
capital for both periods even if the country defaults on other debts coming due. The additional












|3￿ is short-term debt contracted in period |  .
Using only short-term debt increases capital flows in a simple extension of the Eaton and
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As in all models of sovereign debt in which punishment does not actually occur in equilibrium,
thereisanincentivetoincreasethepenaltiesfordefault. Thisisbecausealargerpenaltysustains
higherlevelsoflendingwhicharemoreefficientwhenevertheconstraintsimposedbysovereign
immunity are binding. Short-term lending increases the costs of default in the time-to-build
model.28
Another issue involving sovereignty is the desire to influence policy choices that might ad-
versely affect foreign creditors. The ability to keep a short-leash is essentially the same as
increasing the penalties that can be imposed in the short run. Typical changes in fiscal and
regulatory policies do not constitute default, but can impair the value of long-term loans. Short-
term lending allows a run on banks that may be optimal conditional on an expected policy
change. The cost of run given in equation (17) can increase the cost of such a policy change
discouragingitsadoption. Theprospectsofabailoutalsocangenerateabiastowardsshort-term
debt as noted by others. Other reasons for short-term lending despite a potentially troublesome
maturity mismatch include regulatory and tax treatment that favors short-term borrowing.29
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